Though its economy is tiny, Estonia has occupied a central role in the European debate about the merits of neo-liberalism. Ever since its transition to a market economy the country has pursued consistently neo-liberal strategies. Advocates of neo-liberalism argue that the country has fared very well in doing so and should serve as a model for other countries, especially those in crisis ridden Southern Europe. Critics instead argue that overall economic success has been modest while the chosen strategy has incurred substantial social costs. Moreover, much of its success should be attributed to factors other than it neoliberal policies. The current paper tries to assess the merits of neoliberal policies in Estonia and the reasons for their resilience. It first traces the main economic policy strategies since independence to clarify to what extent its neoliberal reputation is justified. The next section looks at the economic and social outcomes of such policies. Though overall economic performance has lagged behind expectations and poverty and income inequality are relatively high, no serious challenge to neo-liberal policies has even been mounted. Though in part this is due linguistic cleavages which have divided the potential opposition, and the presence of a safety valve in the form of labour migration to the more prosperous Nordic economies, the main reason for the resilience of neoliberalLocalities, Vol. 5, 2015, pp. 103-138 http://dx.doi.org/10. 15299/local.2015.11.5.103 Ton Notermans 104 ism in Estonia is the absence of any credible alternative for a small and highly open economy in combination with the increase in prosperity significant sections of the population have experienced.
Introduction
The era of liberalism is commonly seen to have ended with the Great Depression of the 1930s (James 2001; Steger and Roy 2010) . Faced with debilitating financial crises, radical downturns in GDP, and dramatic increases in unemployment, governments across the western world abandoned their belief in the virtues of unregulated financial markets, free trade, the automatic healing powers of market forces and the appropriateness of balanced budgets and monetary policies aimed a defending a fixed exchange rate. The unravelling of the liberal economic programme commonly started with increasing trade restrictions followed by the abandonment of the Gold Standard, thus allowing for monetary and fiscal policies geared towards domestic growth. Domestic policy autonomy was further strengthened by mounting restrictions on cross-border financial flows as well as a vastly more intrusive regulation of the national financial system. On the microeconomic side the loss of faith in the healing powers of the market was perhaps most emblematically expressed by competition policies, which generally inverted their course from promoting competition to preventing what at that time was called "ruinous competition" by openly or covertly encouraging business collusion. On the labour side this was complemented by a host of policies that sought to stem the fall of (nominal) wages, such as minimum wage legislation and the strengthening of collective bargaining provisions.
Given that its ancestor had met its demise at the hands of a major economic crisis, many observers surmised that the Great Recession 1 , set in motion by the US sub-prime crisis would equally sound the death knell of neo-liberalism. In their initial response to the Great Recession many OECD countries, plus China, were quick to scuttle one of the core macroeconomic tenets of liberalism, namely that deficit-spending will not stimulate the economy but will merely evaporate into more inflation, as sizeable stimulus packages were adopted during [2008] [2009] . Nor did governments place much trust in the healing forces of markets when it
1) The term "Great Recession" is now common usage for the crisis that started in 2007, though given the economic performance of some countries in Europe, the term the great depression of the 21st century might be more appropriate.
came to tackling the crisis in the financial sector. The US Treasury, led by a former Goldman Sachs CEO, was widely criticised for allowing Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs' arch-rival, to go into bankruptcy, and indeed the event remained an exception. Governments came to the rescue of troubled financial services firms with gigantic bail out packages, amounting to 87% of GDP in the case of the UK for example (Birch and Mykhnenko 2010, 15) , while nationalising those firms whose balance sheets were too compromised.
Such open violations of the neo-liberal credo led, e.g. Birch & Mykhnenko (2010, 17) to proclaim that "left-wing ideas are seemingly back in fashion." However, the obituaries proved premature. Admittedly, outside of the EU neoliberalism never inherited the Gold Standard obsession with defending fixed exchange rates from its predecessor, while central banks throughout the OECD area seem to have durably abandoned the belief that expansionary money will result in more inflation and thereby undermine the preconditions for growth, as they are increasingly resorting to unconventional means in a desperate bid to pump money into the economy and restart lending. Yet, the liberal austerity dogma seems to have returned in full force after the brief Keynesian interlude of [2008] [2009] . Especially in the EU, cutting spending to return to balanced budgets, and preferably surpluses, became one of the main tools for overcoming the crisis, not only to deal with economic dislocation in the Eastern periphery in the wake of the 2008 crisis and the Southern periphery during the Eurocrisis, but also as a cornerstone of the macroeconomic policy strategy, preferably to be given constitutional rank. (Konzelmann 2014) As the second main pillar in the European economic policy strategies since the Great Recession, the emphasis on the neo-liberal mainstay of structural adjustment was emphasised even more. The term structural adjustment is shorthand for reducing the impact of the state and giving more reign to market forces. Its main elements consist of privatisation of state-owned enterprises and flexibilisation of the labour market so as to allow wages to fall to market clearing level. With reducing public expenditure and wage costs as primarily goals, welfare state arrangements had to remain a principal target for downsizing as they commonly are the largest expenditure item in most OECD states and frequently have the effect of increasing the reservation wage and contributing to higher nonwage labour costs. Indeed, as Lütz and Kranke (2010) have aptly argued, if the neo-liberal Washington Consensus was ever dead, the EU has promptly resuscitated it.
Nor has the Great Recession sparked the much feared proliferation of restrictions on international economic transactions. Admittedly, the WTO's Doha round, initiated in 2001, seems irretrievably bogged down, but the rapid spread of protectionism that characterised the Great Depression is nowhere to be seen. Instead, trade liberalisation proceeds apace at the regional level, the latest addition being the Transpacific Partnership agreement between Japan and the USA. And while capital controls now again a recognised as a legitimate tools of crisis management by the IMF (Rodrik 2010) , they have only been employed as temporary emergency measures to overcome acute imbalances, such as e.g. in Iceland and Cyprus, but they do not display any intention of becoming a permanent fixture, as instead was the case after the Great Depression. Finally, the reregulation of the financial services industry has remained modest. There was no return to the compartmentalisation that characterised the US banking system from the Great Depression until the repeal of the Glass Steagall act in 1999. Nor has there been a return to the European and Japanese practice of direct intervention by central banks in the credit allocation decisions of private institutions. Indeed, Martin Wolf (2014) has argued that inactivity in this area risk exposing the world economy to another financial meltdown.
Why then has neo-liberalism proven so resilient in the face of major economic upheavals? Given that growth rates were generally higher, unemployment lower and income spread more equally in the pre-neoliberal period from the Second World War to the 1980s, why has there been no widespread popular pressure for a return to the policies that succeeded neo-liberalism's ancestor? In a much-noted analysis, Colin Crouch (2011) argued that liberalism has to be understood not so much as a system based on the trust in free markets but as a set of policies run in the interest of transnational corporations (TNC). When it is in the interest of the TNCs neo-liberalism has no qualms with intervening in markets, as the recent bank bailouts show. The resilience of neo-liberalism, according to
Crouch, then can be explained by the fact that the recent crises have not undermined the power of the TNC's. States remain too dependent on the revenues generated by TNCs to be willing to challenge them, and the industrial working class that supported the pre-neo-liberal model has declined in power so as to no longer being able to challenge the giant corporations.
Though one may question whether the political power of blue collar labour indeed underpinned the dominance of non-liberal policies in themisnamed -Keynesian period, the evident decline of blue collar labour does not explain why there should not have been strong political pressures for change from those suffering from neoliberal policies. In the current debate about the resilience of neo-liberalism, three main answers are given to the latter question. First, neo-liberal policies may have their pathologies but the alternative is worse. In the present day globalised world there is simply no going back to the pre-1980s strategy. Indeed at several points. Crouch comes close to this answer when he argues that "it is difficult to imagine a prosperous life without them TNCs." (Crouch 2011, 52) Secondly, those who suffer most from neo-liberalism, the lowskilled workers, the poor and the unemployed have de-facto lost the power to influence policies, so that there is no electoral pay-off for government in challenging neo-liberalism (Iversen and Soskice 2015) . Thirdly, those who do feel its effects are overwhelmingly negative tend to locate the cause of resilience in the ideational hegemony neoliberal ideas have managed to acquire through a host of mechanisms -such as e.g. (Buchen 2007) . That (neo) liberal orientation was confirmed in the wake of the 2007 crisis, when the country focussed on fiscal austerity and wage cuts to overcome the crisis. As a result, in the current Eurocrisis, Estonia is frequently cited as an example that the Troika strategy of fiscal austerity and structural reforms is indeed the appropriator one and that, by implication, the disastrous economic performance recorded by some South European countries, first and foremost Greece, is due to their unwillingness to take the painful neoliberal medicine rather than to the prescribed medicine being the wrong one.
This status of Estonia as the living proof of the correctness of the neo-
2) The argument is reminiscent of the "false consciousness" used in Marxist theory to explain why the working class was not revolutionary. Helemä and Saar (2015, 567) e.g. argue that the dominant discourse in Estonia has led to "a misperception of class interest at the lower steps of the social hierarchy".
liberal approach, not surprisingly has been challenged by a host of commentators. Two main arguments are adduced. First, it is not justified to see Estonia as a success case because of the extreme economic volatility the country experienced since its transition to a market economy. The liberal shock therapy applied during transition provoked a massive crisis leading to higher unemployment and lower incomes than in soviet times.
Towards the late 1990s, a largely foreign-financed boom set in but because much of it was based on inflows of speculative finance, the 2007-2008 crisis in the major economies, provoked a major crisis. Moreover, by placing the adjustment burden in the latest crisis primarily on workers, the social costs were high, though these cannot be readily inferred from macro statistics (Sommers et al. 2014 ). According to a second line of argument, the relative success of Estonia is not due to neo-liberal policies but to other factors such as its proximity to and dependence on the successful Nordic economies, and large net receipts from the EU, which actually meant a fiscal stimulus programme was pursued (Kattel and Raudla 2013 
How Did Estonia Earn its (Neo) liberal Reputation?
Though widely criticised initially (Sachs, Woo and Yang 2000) , the Chinese path to transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, overall, has proven to be much more successful than the neo-liberal shock therapy applied in most countries of the former Soviet zone. . In that constellation a gradual Chinese style transition was never even discussed, but it also meant that alternative interventionist development strategies, not tainted by any association with communism, such as e.g. the South Korean path, enjoyed not even the slightest chance of making it onto the agenda. 4 The newly established Estonian
Republic enjoyed overwhelming legitimacy, at least amongst the Estonian speaking majority, such that not rapid economic progress but the dismantling of all the centres of power of the former Soviet system could become the most pressing task (Bafoil 2009, 87; Grabbe 2006, 100) . Indeed, such an enthusiastic embrace of neo-liberal shock therapy also characterised the other two East European countries that had been formerly incorporated into the Soviet Union (Latvia and Lithuania) whereas the satellite countries who were not confronted with a sizeable Russian speaking group at the helm of the command economy and amongst the industrial workforce sought to embark on a more embedded form of capitalism (Cimpoca 2013 ).
Yet, defence of statehood is not coterminous to defence of sovereignty.
Even though the concept of a Westphalian state system of allegedly sovereign states pervades much of the international relations literature, the common reality has been one a system dominated by empires with the lesser states having had to concede sovereignty to a smaller or lesser degree to the major powers (Notermans 2014) . Given its size, its historical experience, and its geographic location, the political elites of post-soviet 4) Confronted with an economically wealthier North Korea and a substantial share of domestic communist sympathisers; economic success came to be considered key to regime survival by Park Chung Hee since the early 1960s, such that even a virulently anti-Communist regime would shun liberal economic recipes and instead embark on a heavy handed, and extremely successful, interventionist development strategy. (Kang 2004) Estonia were strongly convinced that defending statehood against possible Russian interference required rapid political and economic integration with the west, and this meant NATO membership, EU membership and openness to foreign investors. Since the early 1990s, therefore Estonian strategies of economic transition and institution building, were increasingly shaped by the requirement of qualifying as soon as possible for EU membership. 5 In many areas the EU did indeed insists on a liberal approach. Attempts to protect domestic industries and services so as to better prepare them for future competition with the more advanced competitors further west were generally discouraged by the EU in favour of a strategy of rapid market opening and foreign ownership. Moreover, the interventionist vertical industrial policy strategies that account for much of the rapid economic success of South Korea would conflict with the EU's fundamental principle of a "level playing field" between all member states, its competition policy and its restrictions on state aid.
However, the requirements of EU membership cannot be held responsible for the fundamental neo-liberal orientation of Estonian economic policies. The strategy of relaying primarily on foreign capital to build the economy of the new Estonia, rather than pursuing an interventionist industrial policy dovetailed perfectly with the strategic calculus of postsoviet Estonian elites. Rapid privatisation, with the resulting bankruptcy of a substantial share of the economy, quickly erased much of the soviet industrial legacy. In addition to its low level of wages and a fairly well educated work-force, its geographic proximity to the high-wage and high-tax Nordic economies, Finland in particular, also seemed to suggest that the country was well placed to successfully execute a rapid economic catch-up by relying on foreign investors.
As a result, Estonia commonly occupied top ranks in comparative as-5) Estonia established diplomatic relations with the EU, in 1995 an association agreement with the EU, implying free trade, came into force and in November of the same year its membership application was submitted.
sessments of the speed and comprehensiveness of economic reforms, such as e.g. those regularly conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Staehr 2004) . Price liberalisation, which had already started while the country still was legally a part of the Soviet Union, was completed by January 1993, Privatisation of SOEs was conducted with similar speed, essentially being completed by 1995, with the exception of a few natural monopolies. (Staehr 2004, 49) The small and medium enterprises (SME) were auctioned off first, while the larger firms took a bit longer. Initially, insiders were given privileged treatment, but this policy was rapidly reversed. As a result, foreign ownership in the Estonian economy increased substantially. Though in contrast with the global practice but in keeping with the dictum of liberal trade theory, Estonia quickly and unilaterally removed all trade restrictions, making it one of the very few countries in the world that has ever practised free trade. Moreover, along with Lithuania and Hungary, Estonia is one of the very few countries in the EU that has implemented one of neoliberalism's less popular proposals, namely a flat rate income tax. 7 In 1994 a flat rate of 26% was introduced, which was subsequently reduced to 21%. The advocates of a flat tax promote it as administratively simple, socially fair and growth and efficiency enhancing because business friendly (Hall et al. 1996) . The latter is said to occur because it removes the built in brake on the profit incentive constituted by progressive taxation and capital gains taxes. Most EU countries, though have resisted introducing s similar system, not only because it unduly restricts the state's revenue base, but also because of a widespread conviction that social fairness dictates that those who are able to shoulder a larger tax burden relative to their income should also be required to do so. Taxes, 6) Even Britain retained tariffs for revenue purposes after the repeal of the corn laws in 1846. 7) On the spread of flat tax rates in Eastern Europe, see Aligica and Evans 2009. on corporate profits, furthermore were abolished in 2000.
Despite its flat rate personal income tax, however, the size of the Estonian state, when measured in terms of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP is not significantly smaller than most other European nations, nor is the size of the state shrinking over time (Table 2) . Nor is Estonia an exception in this regard. Though shrinking the size of the state was one of the foremost objectives of the liberal project, throughout the OECD the neo-liberal revolution has merely managed to halt or reduce the growth rates of public revenues and expenditures with no shrinkage in sight, while public debt and deficits overall have increased much more rapidly than before 1980.
Also somewhat in contrast with its reputation of a super-liberal market reformer stands the fact that no wholesale dismantling of the welfare system inherited from the Soviet Union was attempted. The national health system, e.g. has been maintained until today. And in 1991 unemployment insurance was introduced as a response to the emergence of a phenomenon that had been unknown in the Soviet Union, though the replacement ratio is quite low and many unemployed are not covered because of a lack of contribution history or because of the short duration of benefit payments. As is typical of the conservative model of welfare provision in Europe, much of the system is contribution financed with a 33% percent payroll tax introduced to that purpose in the early 1990s.
In terms of the third, element of the transition strategy, macroeconomic policies to stamp inflation out of the system, the neo-liberal recipe in facts betrays a surprisingly interventionist bend. If a conviction in the superiority of market solutions really informs neo-liberal recipes, in the monetary field it should advocate the abolishment of the government issue of legal tender in favour on money issue by commercial banks, or at least market determined exchange rates. Whereas the first element has never been seriously considered by any neo-liberals that managed to get close to the levers of economic policy making, the USA, at least has dis- Estonia has benefitted from large inflows of capital ever since it had become clear that it would join the EU, and the counterparts of these inflows were substantial current account deficits. As a result of the financial meltdown in the US these inflows, however came to a sudden stop which required a rapid turnaround in the balance of payments. Though even the IMF at times thought the strategy was too severe, the country responded with a radical programme of expenditure cuts, labour market flexibilisation and public sector wage cuts, thus further cementing its neoliberal reputation (Sommers et al. 2014 ).
Economic and Social Outcomes
How then has Estonia fared with its liberal strategy in economic and social terms? Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of its post-Soviet economic development is the high degree of volatility. Since the early 1990s the country has gone through two bust-boom cycles, while currently it seems to be stuck in a middle income trap. The transition to a market economy proved not to be the short J-curve like contraction that was predicted by foreign advisors and international financial institutions, but instead gave rise to a major depression in the wake of which GDP fell by over 1/3. Recovery set in by the mid-1990s soon to be replaced by another crisis; this time an imported one as the East Asian crisis of 1997 spread to Russia, leading to its default in 1998. Recovery was quick though. Fuelled by substantial inflows of foreign capital, annual growth rates since the beginning of the millennium were far above EU average, at times edging close to 10%. Overall, Estonia has experienced convergence in per capita GDP since 1995 with the rest of the EU, though it's per capita income still is less than half that of the EU (15) 9 , while the gap with its closest neighbour (Finland) is significantly wider (Table 1) . Unemployment rates largely reflect the volatility of GDP growth in Estonia. The transition crisis led to a massive rise in unemployment, which, despite significant outward migration of labour could not be brought down to EU levels until the boom of the 2000s. The 2008 crisis again caused a massive increase, though currently unemployment rates are somewhat below the EU levels. For most of the first 20 years of its independence, the country ran up considerable current account deficits. The counterpart to those deficits was a rapidly increasing foreign indebtedness, which made the country extremely vulnerable to the sudden stop in capital inflows that resulted as a fallout of the 2007/2008 US crisis. The strict programme of austerity and wage cuts that was followed in that crisis, however, managed to turn the current account deficit around, though at the cost of a significant recession. Unlike e.g. Greece, over-indebtedness in Estonia was purely a private sector problem. In macroeconomic terms, Estonia's neoliberal orientation is maybe best reflected in the management of its fiscal policies.
Due to its extremely prudent expenditure policy, the public debt of Estonia is by far the lowest in the EU, although since the 2008/9 crisis also Estonia has not managed to escape the general European trend of rising public debt. 9) EU(15) refers to the membership of the EU before the enlargement to the countries formerly in the Soviet zone of influence, plus Malta and Cyprus. The very low debt level, however, does not imply a very small state.
Though tax revenues as a share of GDP are below EU level, they tend to be higher than in most East European countries (Table 2 ). Rather the low debt results from a policy of keeping expenditure within the space afforded by revenues. In terms, of public social expenditure, however, the Estonian state is significantly smaller than East European countries with similar levels of income. 
Political Outcomes
Though the country has experienced repeated economic hardships and does suffer from above average poverty and inequality, no political majority has ever arisen in favour of a different strategy. To understand why, it should perhaps first be pointed out that the prefix "neo" denotes a much diluted liberal component as compared to its historical predecessor. (2009) Even though economic hardship, and especially cutbacks in the social welfare system, as well as the current paucity of welfare previsions along with the relatively pronounced poverty and income inequality, has induced voter pressure for a more moderately liberal course, a political challenge to the neo-liberal policy orientation has never been mounted.
As Aligica and Evans
Perhaps with the exception of Prime Minister Tiit Vähi's cabinet of 1995, the government has firmly remained in liberal-conservative hands.
In theory this might be because such policies are imposed from the outside on Estonia, because the wishes of the population are not accurately reflected in policy-making, or because the majority of the electorate does not wish to mount a leftist challenge to neo-liberalism.
Though the former two factors are relevant, the overwhelming reason for the non-death of neo-liberalism in Estonia remains that both the majority of the political elites and the electorate can discern no credible leftist alternative to the current policy orientation. Indeed, if anything, a trend towards the political right can be observed since the most recent crisis.
Being a member state of the EU, Estonia is not a fully sovereign country such that deviations from a neo-liberal course not necessarily have to be rooted in changes in the domestic balance of political power.
Given its small voting power in the EU, Tallinn cannot avail itself of sufficient means to block most of the policy changes originating in Brussels. 10 With its emphasis on the four freedoms [free movement of 10) In those areas where the EU decides by consensus, in theory Estonian opposition alone would be sufficient to block changes, yet the history of European integra-capital, labour, goods and services], a level playing field, and competition policy, the EU does display a liberal orientation in its core project of the single market, but the EU enjoys little or no authority over national welfare policies, taxation and labour market regulation.
However, if anything, EU membership has probably served to dilute rather than reinforce neo-liberalism in Estonia. The EU's discriminatory trade approach forced Estonia to abandon its policy of free trade with respect to non-members. The highly interventionist and protectionist
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), traditionally has been and remains the largest item on the EU budget, currently accounting for a bit under 45% of total expenditures. For Estonia, participation in the CAP implied a turn to more protectionism and state intervention in this area. Moreover, Estonia receives substantial transfer from the EU. In 2013 EU funds for Estonia amounted to €973 million (5.46% of GNI) as compared to an Estonian contribution to the EU budget of €190 million. 11 Seventy percent of EU spending was devoted to regional policies. In social policies, to give a final example, the Estonian government has, somewhat reluctantly been pushed by the EU to establish a publicly funded rehabilitation programme for alcohol addiction; a problem which is rife in the country especially amongst the lower income groups. In short, the absence of a challenge to neo-liberalism cannot be attributed to the EU but must be rooted in domestic political dynamics.
In order for electoral competition to induce political parties to be sensitive to the wishes of the electorate, those parties must be stable organisations with a long term perspective such that the threat of a loss of electoral popularity creates incentives for programmatic change.
However, such has frequently not been the case in the East European tion show that it is not feasible for a small country to block policies that enjoy the support of all the larger members. 11) Available online at http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-ountries/estonia// index_en.htm#goto_2.
party systems that emerged after the fall of communism (GrzymalaBusse 2007). In many cases East European parties systems are characterised by extreme volatility with parties generally not expecting, or intending to survive for more than on term (Cabada et al. 2015, Ch. 5) .
Corporate capture marks such systems as the party engages in enrichment of its leading politicians and main supporters during that one term in office, while new parties that emerge on a wave of voter support for cleaner government will generally engage in similar strategies and be similarly short-lived (Innes 2014) . With parties functioning as distributional coalitions with a very short term perspective loss of electoral popularity no longer can function as a deterrent to such strategies of plunder.
Though also displaying a high degree of volatility in its early years, both in terms of party birth and decline, as well is in voting behaviour (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003) , the Estonian party system has been spared such a fate. Over time a relatively stable system centred on four main and durable parties has crystallised (Table 5) The Though the Estonian Party system as such would allow for effective popular contestation of the policies pursued it has managed to dilute the potential opposition to some of its policies by mean of two mechanism of exclusion. First, as the citizenship laws of independent Estonia stipulated that citizens needed to demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the Estonian language, initially a large share of those who had migrated from other parts of the Soviet Union during communist times effectively were unable to acquire citizenship in the short term and thus were ineligible to vote. That meant that during the first democratic (post-soviet) elections in September of 1992 half a million residents were excluded, reducing the electorate to roughly 1,017,000 persons (Grofman et al. 1999, 231) . The party even managed to gather a slightly larger share of the votes in the 2011 election. Though exposed to severe economic hardship at points, the majority of the population has experienced a substantial increase in income since Soviet times. Moreover, the economically dismal 1990s
were followed by a spectacular boom which served to silence much of the opposition that had visibly been gaining in strength since the late 1990s.
Nor can Estonia look to a successful example of alternative policies that might serve to mitigate this historically determined recoil from anything that challenges its fundamental neo-liberal convictions. Indeed both in terms of economic and political stability, Estonia clearly is the success case amongst the three former soviet republics on the Baltic shore, such that looking west produces no impetus for change. Nor can looking north provide such inspiration. As Finland is encountering increasingly hard times, it does not embrace the Left's preferred macroeconomic strategy of deficit spending, possibly coupled with devaluation -i.e. exit from the Euro and exchange controls -but emphasises the need for fiscal austerity and improved competitiveness through increased wage flexibility. If anything, the Greek's states inability to pay back its debt, which precipitated the current Eurocrisis, has provided Estonian governments with more ammunition to support its prudent fiscal policy. As a tiny country that is highly dependent on external developments for its well-being, Estonian governments can see no merits in go-it-alone economic policies, and, not unreasonably, in particular are not willing to embark on an untested, and frequently not very well defined, leftist strategy of challenging the policy orthodoxy. In Indeed, the break with liberalism was not the making of leftist parties swept into power in reaction to the economic dislocations of the Great Depression. In Germany, Japan and Italy, this sea-change came about under fascist, or militarist in the case of Japan, governments. In Estonia the political outcome of the Great Depression was a strengthening of the far right followed by a coup in 1933 by Konstantin Päts, whose authoritarian regime survived until the Soviet occupation in 1940 (Raun 1997, 340) . In those countries that managed to defend a democratic constitution, the break with orthodoxy was most frequently implemented by centrist or conservative parties that had previously upheld the liberal dogma. In the USA, for example, president Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who is generally viewed as the founder of a new age in economic policy management, was initially elected on the basis of a platform that promised austerity in order to reverse the mounting budget deficits under his predecessor Herbert Hoover (Barber 1985) . Even in Sweden, which has traditionally figured as the poster boy of social democratic policies, the crucial break with the Gold Standard, which then allowed for a departure from liberal orthodoxy also in fiscal matters was a decision the Social Democrats dared not take and instead left to a conservative government (Notermans 2000) . In general, it was only after the Second World War that leftist parties benefited electorally from the changes first initiated by their competitors further to the right.
The current crisis in Europe seems to be no exception to this pattern.
Apart from the leftist Syriza party in Greece -which has proven unable to bring about a change in adjustment strategies -it is right-wing and populist parties that seem to benefit most from the current crisis; from On the national level a challenge to the current policies is most likely to emerge from a conflict between the main ideological tendencies that characterise Estonia; economic liberalism, social conservatism and nationalism. The fear that the Estonian language and culture might disappear has been palatably present since Soviet times. Politically that fear points to the need to increase birth rates and reduce both immigration and emigration. Despite their reluctance to increase welfare spending, successive governments have significantly increased support to families with children in order to boost fertility rates. Though reducing migration is currently only on the agenda of the far right, the issue of survival of the national culture is widely shared also outside these circles.
Moreover, a challenge to liberalism from that quarter will be much harder to resist as it is not tainted by any possible association with the Soviet past. Apart from more targeted welfare programmes to promote childbirth, this could also imply calls for a much improved overall welfare system as well as significant wage increase, in the public sector at least, to deter emigration. Moreover Estonia might join the ranks of those countries openly opposed to the EU's current immigration and asylum policy. In any case, change will be gradual, with no repetition of the quick demise of liberalism in the Great Depression on the horizon.
